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SPECULATIVE TRADING, PROSPECT THEORY AND TRANSACTION COSTS
ALEX S.L. TSE AND HARRY ZHENG
Abstract. A speculative agent with Prospect Theory preference chooses the optimal time to purchase
and then to sell an indivisible risky asset as to maximize the expected utility of the round-trip profit net
of transaction costs. The optimization problem is formulated as a sequential optimal stopping problem
and we provide a complete characterization of the solution. Depending on the preference and market
parameters as well as the initial price of the asset, the optimal strategy can be “buy and hold”, “buy low
sell high”, “buy high sell higher” or “no trading”. Transaction costs do not necessarily curb speculative
trading. For example, while a large proportional transaction cost on sale can unambiguously suppress
trading participation, introducing a fixed market entry fee will indeed encourage trading when the asset
price level is high.
1. Introduction
When it comes to modeling of trading behaviors, the standard economic paradigm is the maximization
of risk-averse agents’ expected utility in a frictionless market. This criteria however has been criticized on
many levels. In terms of trading environment, financial friction is omnipresent in reality where transactions
are subject to various costs; In terms of agents’ preferences, behavioral economics literature suggests that
many individuals do not make decisions in accordance to expected utility theory. First, utilities are not
necessarily derived from final wealth but typically what matters is the change in wealth relative to some
reference point. Second, individuals are usually risk-averse over the domain of gains but risk-seeking over
the domain of losses - this can be captured by an S-shaped utility function. Finally, individuals may fail
to take portfolio effect into account when making investment decision and this phenomenon is known as
narrow framing. These psychological ideas are explored for example in the seminal work of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Kahneman and
Lovallo (1993).
We develop a simple dynamic trading model which captures a number of stylized behavioral biases of
individuals and market friction. In our setup, trading is costly due to proportional transaction costs as
well as a fixed market entry fee. The goal of an agent is to find the optimal time to buy and then to sell
an indivisible risky asset to maximize the expected utility of the round-trip profit under Prospect Theory
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preference of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). While a realistic economy can consist of multiple assets, we
can interpret the assumption of a single indivisible asset as a manifestation of narrow framing such that
the trading decision associated with one particular unit of asset can be completely isolated from the other
investment opportunities. We believe the model is the best suitable to describe the trading behaviors
of speculative agents. These “less-than-fully” rational agents purchase and sell an asset with a narrow
objective of making a one-off round-trip profit rather than supporting consumption or stipulating a long
term portfolio growth.
We solve a sequential optimal stopping problem under S-shaped utility function to identify the entry
and exit time of the market by the agent. In the first stage of the problem we focus on the exit strategy of
the agent: Conditional on the ownership of the asset purchased at a given price level (which determines
the agents reference point), the optimal liquidation problem is solved. Then the value function of the
exit problem reflects the utility value of purchasing the asset at different price level. Upon comparison
against the utility value of inaction, this constitutes the payoff function of the real option to purchase
the asset which is then used in the second stage problem concerning the entry decision of the agent: The
agent picks the optimal time to enter the trade as to maximize the expected payoff of this real option to
purchase the asset.
Martingale method is employed to solve the underlying optimal stopping problems, which has an
important advantage over the HJB equation approach. The traditional route to solve an optimal stopping
problem is to first conjecture a candidate optimal stopping rule and then the dynamic programming
principle is invoked to derive a free boundary value problem that the value function should satisfy. This
approach will work for as long as we are able to identify the correct form of the optimal stopping rule but
this exercise may not be trivial. As it turns out, the optimal continuation region of our entry problem can
either be connected or disconnected depending on the transaction costs level. It is thus difficult to adopt
the HJB equation approach since we do not know the correct form of the optimal stopping rule upfront.
In contrast, the martingale method does not require any priori conjecture on the optimal strategy. The
optimal continuation/stopping set can be deduced directly by studying the smallest concave majorant to
a suitably scaled payoff function.
Despite its relatively simple nature, our model is capable of generating a rich variety of trading behaviors
such as “buy and hold”, “buy low sell high”, “buy high sell higher” and “no trading”. The risk-seeking
preference of a behavioral agent over the loss domain will typically induce him to enter the trade at all
price level. His trading behaviors can be heavily influenced by transaction costs, but the precise effect
crucially depends on the nature of these costs. Generally speaking, a high proportional (fixed) transaction
cost discourages trading at a high (low) nominal price. When proportional costs are high and the asset
is expensive, the agent prefers waiting until the price level declines hence he is more inclined to consider
a “buy low sell high strategy. But if instead the fixed entry fee is high and the asset is cheap, the agent
SPECULATIVE TRADING, PROSPECT THEORY AND TRANSACTION COSTS 3
might prefer delaying the purchase decision until the asset reaches a higher price level, and this leads
to a trading pattern of “buy high sell higher. The subtle impact of transaction costs leads to interesting
policy implications on how speculative trading can be curbed effectively. For example, a surprisingly
result is that imposing a fixed market entry fee might indeed accelerate rather than cool down trading
participation.
Our paper is closely related to the literature of optimal stopping under S-shaped utility function. Kyle
et al. (2006) and Henderson (2012) consider a one-off optimal liquidation problem in which the agent
solves for the optimal time to liquidate an endowed risky asset to maximize the expected Prospect Theory
utility. They do not consider the purchase decision and the reference point is taken as some exogenously
given status quo. Our mathematical setup follows that of Henderson (2012) featuring geometric Brownian
motion of price process and piecewise power utility function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). A main
contribution of our paper is that we further endogenize the reference point which depends on the purchase
price of the asset, and the optimal purchase price must be determined as a part of the optimization
problem. In addition, we also highlight the roles of transaction costs on the agents’ trading behaviors.
Another very relevant class of work is the realization utility model which further incorporates reinvest-
ment possibility within a behavioral optimal stopping model. In Barberis and Xiong (2012), Ingersoll and
Jin (2013) and He and Yang (2019), the agent repeatedly purchases and sells an asset to maximize the
sum of utility bursts realized from the gain and loss associated with each round-trip transaction. In a
certain sense, their models consider endogenized reference point which is continuously updated based on
the most recent purchase price of the asset. However, the purchase decision is exogenously given in many
of these models where the agent is simply assumed to buy the asset again immediately after a sale. The
only exception is He and Yang (2019) who carefully analyze the purchase decision of the agent, but in
any case they find that the purchase strategy is trivial where the agent either buys the asset immediately
after a sale or never enters the trade again. Our model differs from the realization utility model in a
way that we do not consider perpetual reinvestment opportunities (which can be understood as narrow
framing that the agent only focuses on a single episode of the trading experience when evaluating the
entry and exit strategies). Nonetheless, the optimal purchase region of our model is non-trivial under
typical parameters which encapsulates many realistic trading strategies.
Beyond the context of behavioral economics, there are a few works attempting to model the sequential
purchase and sale decisions under stochastic control framework. However, identification of a modeling
setup which can generate reasonable trading patterns proves to be much more difficult than expected.
On the one hand, Zervos et al. (2013, p.561) report that “...the prime example of an asset price process,
namely, the geometric Brownian motion, does not allow for optimal buying and selling strategies that have
a sequential nature”. Indeed, existing literature which gives “buy low sell high” as an optimal trading
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strategy often relies on extra statistical features of the asset price process such as mean reversion.1 See
for example Zhang and Zhang (2008), Song et al. (2009), Leung et al. (2015) and Leung and Li (2015).
On the other hand, momentum-based trading strategy is also rarely studied in mathematical finance
literature. The scarce examples include the work of Dai et al. (2010) and Dai et al. (2016) who find
that trend-following strategy is optimal under a regime-switching model of asset price. We contribute to
this strand of literature by showing that a trading model based on a simple geometric Brownian motion
can also generate many realistic trading patterns including both reversal strategy (buy low sell high) and
momentum strategy (buy high sell higher). This is achieved via incorporating elements of behavioral
preferences and market friction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the model and the
underlying optimization problem. We outline the solution methods to solve the optimal stopping problems
in Section 3. The main results and the economic intuitions are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The technical proofs are collected in the appendix.
2. Problem description
2.1. Trading environment and agent’s preference. Let (Ω,F , {Ft},P) be a filtered probability space
satisfying the usual conditions which supports a one-dimensional Brownian motion B = (Bt)t≥0. There
is a single indivisible risky asset in the economy. Its price process P = (Pt)t≥0 is modeled by a one-
dimensional diffusion with state space J ⊆ R+ and dynamics of
dPt = µ(Pt)dt+ σ(Pt)dBt,
where µ : J → R and σ : J → (0,∞) are Borel functions. J is assumed to be an interval with endpoints
0 ≤ aJ < bJ ≤ ∞ and that P is regular in (aJ , bJ ).
We assume that interest rate is zero in our exposition. For the non-zero interest rate case one can
interpret the process P as the numeraire-adjusted price of the asset. Then the drift term µ(·) can be
viewed as the instantaneous excess return of the risky asset.
Trading in the asset is costly. If the agent wants to purchase the asset at its current price p, he will
need to pay λp+ Ψ to initiate the trade where λ ∈ [1,∞) is the proportional transaction cost on purchase
and Ψ ≥ 0 represents a fixed market entry fee. When the agent sells the asset at price p, he will only
receive γp where γ ∈ (0, 1] is the proportional transaction cost on sale.2 Suppose the agent has executed
1The optimal investment rule in the classical Merton (1969, 1971) portfolio selection problem can also be viewed as a buy
low sell high strategy: Since the agent keeps a constant fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset, extra units of risky
asset are sold (purchased) when the price increases (falls), ceteris paribus. In our paper, we focus on a single indivisible
asset and do not consider portfolio effect.
2We do not consider fixed transaction cost on sale. Part of the reason is to simplify the mathematical analysis in the
forthcoming sections (see Remark 2 in Section 4.). For many practical applications, it is also reasonable to assume that the
fixed cost on market entry is much more significant than the fixed exit cost.
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a round-trip trade where he bought and then sold the asset at time τ and ν (with τ ≤ ν), the financial
payoff of the trade net of all transaction costs is
γPν − λPτ −Ψ. (1)
Preference of the agent is described by Prospect Theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Under this
framework, utility is derived from gains and losses relative to some reference point rather than the total
wealth. Individuals are typically risk-averse over the domain of gains and risk-seeking over the domain
of losses. This can be captured by an S-shaped utility function U : R → R with U(0) = 0 and that U is
concave (resp. convex) over R+ (resp. R−). Finally, individuals also exhibit loss-aversion such that the
negative utility brought by a unit of loss is much larger in magnitude than the positive utility from a unit
of gain. Denote by R the constant reference point of the agent. R can simply be an exogenously given
constant outside the model specification, but it can also be interpreted as a preference parameter of the
agent which reflects his “aspiration level” in the sense of Lopes and Oden (1999) where a motivated agent
will set a higher economic benchmark. The Prospect Theory value of a random variable X is evaluated
by E[U(X −R)].
2.2. Agent’s objective. Loosely speaking, the objective of the agent is to find the optimal time to buy
and then to sell the asset to maximize the Prospect Theory value of the speculative trading payoff (1).
The precise problem formulation is given in the following two subsections. Similar two-stage sequential
stopping problems are considered by Leung et al. (2015) and Leung and Li (2015) as well.
2.2.1. Exit problem. Suppose for the moment that the agent is endowed with one unit of the asset to
begin with and we also temporarily relabel the reference point of the agent as a constant H. The goal of
the agent in the exit problem is to find the optimal time to sell the endowed asset. When the asset is sold
at time ν, the utility of gain and loss relative to the reference point is G1(Pν ;H) := U(γPν − H) after
taking the transaction costs into account. The agent solves for the optimal selling time ν to maximize the
expected Prospect Theory utility of the proceed, which involves solving an optimal stopping problem of
V1(p;H) := sup
ν∈T
E
[
G1(Pτ ;H)
∣∣∣P0 = p] = sup
ν∈T
E
[
U(γPν −H)
∣∣∣P0 = p] (2)
over the set of {Ft}-stopping time denoted by T . Write the optimizer to problem (2) as ν∗(p) which in
general depends on the initial price level p.
2.2.2. Entry problem. Now we assume that the agent does not own any asset to begin with. His economic
objective is to determine the optimal times to purchase (and then to sell) the risky asset to maximize the
expected utility of the profit of this round-trip trade under Prospect Theory preference.
At a given current asset price level p, there are two possible actions for the agent. First, he can opt
to initiate the speculative trade by buying the asset now and sell it in the future. When the asset is
liquidated at his choice of the sale time ν, the profit-and-loss of the trade (relative to his reference level
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R) is γPν − λp − Ψ − R. The agent can find the best time of sale to maximize his expected utility by
solving problem (2) on setting H = λp+ Ψ +R.3 Then the best possible expected utility he can attain is
sup
ν∈T
E
[
U(γPν − λp−Ψ−R)
∣∣∣P0 = p] = V1(p;λp+ Ψ +R)
if he decides to enter the trade at the given price of p.
Alternatively, the agent can forgo the opportunity to enter the trade. In this case, the financial payoff
of this economic decision is a constant of zero. After taking the reference point R into account, the utility
he will receive is just a constant of U(−R).
Therefore, the opportunity to enter the speculative trade can be viewed as a real option. At a given
price level p the agent is willing to enter the trade if and only if the maximal expected utility of trading
is not less than that of inaction, i.e. V1(p;λp + Ψ + R) ≥ U(−R). This is similar to a financial option
being in-the-money. The payoff of this real option to the agent in utility terms as a function of price level
p is given by
G2(p) := max {V1(p;λp+ Ψ +R), U(−R)} . (3)
The entry problem for the agent is to find the optimal time to initiate the trade as to maximize the
expected value of (3). It is equivalent to solving
V2(p) := sup
τ∈T
E [G2(Pτ )|P0 = p] = sup
τ∈T
E [max {V1(Pτ ;λPτ + Ψ +R), U(−R)} |P0 = p] (4)
provided that the exit problem value function V1 is well defined.
Let the optimizer to problem (4) be τ∗(p). With p being the initial price of the asset at t = 0,
the agent will purchase the asset at the stopping time t = τ∗(p). Then conditional on the realization
of the entry price level Pτ∗(p), the agent solves the exit problem (2) under initial value Pτ∗(p). The
corresponding optimizer ν∗(Pτ∗(p)) reflects the time lapse between the initiation and closure of the trade.
In particular, the agent will sell the asset at the stopping time t = τ∗(p) + ν∗(Pτ∗(p)). This gives the
complete characterization of the optimal entry and exit strategy of the agent.4
3. The solution methods
In this section we discuss the martingale approach to solve a general one-dimensional stopping problem
without discounting,5 which is based on Dynkin and Yushkevich (1969) and Dayanik and Karatzas (2003).
3In the exit problem, conditional on the purchase price p of the asset the reference point H = λp+Ψ+R can be viewed as
an exogenously given constant. But in the second stage of the optimization, we are going to determine the optimal purchase
price. Hence the reference point in our Prospect Theory trading model is indeed an endogenous one.
4It is possible to have P(τ∗(p) <∞) < 1. In other words, there is a possibility that the entry strategy is not executed in
finite time, and hence there is no decision to sell. The economic payoff in this scenario is zero. See the discussion in Section
4.
5Similar to Henderson (2012), Xu and Zhou (2013) and Henderson et al. (2018), we do not explicitly consider subjective
discounting. Under discounting the agent is much more inclined to delay losses and to realize profits earlier, this will lead to
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As explained in the introduction, the key advantage of this method over the classical HJB equation
approach is that we do not have to provide a priori conjecture of the form of the optimal stopping rule.
Consider a general optimal stopping problem in form of
V (p) = sup
τ∈T
E[G(Pτ )|P0 = p]
for some payoff function G. Under standard theory of optimal stopping, the optimal stopping time can
be characterized by the first exit time of the process from some open set C, i.e. the optimal stopping time
has the form τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt /∈ C}. In a one-dimensional diffusion setting, it is sufficient to consider
stopping times of the class τa,b := τa ∧ τb where τa := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt = a} and τb := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt = b}
with a ≤ p ≤ b. Here [a, b] ⊆ J is the unknown interval to be identified (and it depends on p in general).
Let s(·) be the scale function of process P (which is unique up to affine transformation) defined as
a strictly increasing function such that Θt := s(Pt) is a local martingale. A simple application of Ito’s
lemma shows that s(·) should solve the second order differential equation
σ2(p)
2
s′′(p) + µ(p)s′(p) = 0. (5)
Let θ := s(p). Then
J(p; τa,b) := E[G(Pτa,b)|P0 = p] = E[G(s−1(Θτa,b))|Θ0 = θ]
= E[φ(Θτa,b)|Θ0 = θ]
= P(τa < τb|Θ0 = θ)φ(s(a)) + P(τb < τa|Θ0 = θ)φ(s(b))
=
s(b)− θ
s(b)− s(a)φ(s(a)) +
θ − s(a)
s(b)− s(a)φ(s(b))
where φ := G◦s−1. The above can be maximized with respect to a and b. Moreover, the dummy variables
a and b can be replaced by a′ = s(a) and b′ = s(b). Hence
V (p) = sup
a,b:a≤p≤b
J(p; τa,b) = sup
a′,b′:a′≤θ≤b′
[
b′ − θ
b′ − a′φ(a
′) +
θ − a′
b′ − a′φ(b
′)
]
=: v(θ)
and thus V (p) = v(s(p)). The scaled value function v(θ) can be characterized by the smallest concave
majorant to the scaled payoff function φ(θ) = G(s−1(θ)) over s(J ) which is defined as an interval with
endpoints s(aJ ) and s(bJ ). The continuation set associated with the optimal stopping time is given by
C = {p ∈ J : v(s(p)) > φ(s(p)) = G(p)}.
This provides us an algorithm to solve problem (2) and (4) sequentially. Recall that the payoff function
of the exit problem is G1(p;H) = U(γp − H). The value function of the exit problem is then given by
V1(p;H) = g¯1(s(p);H) where g¯1 = g¯1(θ;H) is the smallest concave majorant of
g1(θ;H) := G1(s
−1(θ);H) = U(γs−1(θ)−H).
an extreme disposition effect which is not consistent with the empirical trading pattern of retail investors. See the discussion
in Henderson (2012).
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In turn, the payoff function of the entry problem is G2(p) := max{V1(p;λp+Ψ+R), U(−R)}. We identify
g¯2 = g¯2(θ) as the smallest concave majorant of
g2(θ) := G2(s
−1(θ)) = max{V1(s−1(θ);λs−1(θ) + Ψ +R), U(−R)}
= max{g¯1(θ;λs−1(θ) + Ψ +R), U(−R)}.
Then the value function of the entry problem is V2(p) = g¯2(s(p)).
4. Main results
The procedures described in Section 3 is very generic and can be applied to solve the sequential optimal
stopping problem under a range of model specifications. To derive stronger analytical results, in the rest
of this paper we specialize to the piecewise power utility function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in
form of
U(x) =
x
α, x > 0;
−k|x|α, x ≤ 0.
Here α ∈ (0, 1) such that 1 − α is the level of risk-aversion and risk-seeking on the domain of gains and
losses, and k > 1 controls the degree of loss-aversion. Experimental results of Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) give an estimation of α = 0.88 and k = 2.25.
The price process of the risky asset P = (Pt)t≥0 is assumed to be a geometric Brownian motion
dPt = Pt(µdt+ σdBt)
with µ ≥ 0 and σ > 0 being the constant drift and volatility of the asset. Define β := 1 − 2µσ2 ≤ 1, then
by substituting µ(p) = µp and σ(p) = σp in (5) a scale function of P can be found as
s(x) =

xβ , β > 0;
lnx, β = 0;
x−β , β < 0.
Finally, we assume R > 0 so that the reference point of the agent is always positive. This is not
unreasonable since the reference point in the context of investment is usually taken as some performance
benchmark that an agent wants to outperform and such a goal is typically a positive one.
We first state the solution to the exit problem which is based on Henderson (2012).
Lemma 1 (Proposition 2 and 3 of Henderson (2012)). For the exit problem (2):
(1) If β ≤ 0 or 0 < β < α < 1, the exit problem is ill-posed and the agent will never sell the asset.
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(2) If α < β ≤ 1 or α = β < 1, the agent will sell the asset when its price level first reaches cHγ or
above where c > 1 is a constant given by the solution to the equation
α
β
c(c− 1)α−1 − (c− 1)α − k = 0. (6)
The value function is given by
V1(p;H) =

α
β c
1−β(c− 1)α−1Hα−β(γp)β − kHα, p < cHγ ;
(γp−H)α, p ≥ cHγ .
(7)
The exit problem is ill-posed under the parameters combination in case (1) of Lemma 1, which arises
when the performance of the asset is too good relative to the agent’s risk-aversion level over gains. In
particular, one can consider a sequence of sale strategy in form of νn := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt ≥ n} and then the
agent’s expected utility will tend to infinity when n→∞. This corresponds to a strategy that the agent
never sells the endowed asset. In the non-degenerate case (2), the optimal sale strategy is a gain-exit
rule where the agent is looking to sell the asset at a profit without considering stop-loss. Note that the
gain-exit target cHγ is increasing in transaction costs (i.e. decreasing in γ). It means that the agent tends
to delay the sale decision in a more costly trading environment.
Remark 1. Under geometric Brownian motion model of price process, Pt = exp
[(
µ− σ22
)
t+ σBt
]
=
exp
[
σ
(−σ2βt+Bt)]. If β > 0, the Brownian motion in the exponent has negative drift so that P may
not reach any arbitrarily given level above its starting value in finite time and we have limt→∞ Pt = 0
almost surely. If the initial price of the asset is below the gain-exit target then there is a strictly positive
probability that the asset is never sold. Moreover, the agent who fails to sell the asset at his target
gain-exit level will suffer a total loss in the long run.
Remark 2. The expression of the target gain-exit threshold and in turn the value function of the exit
problem are available in close-form, thanks to the specialization that the degree of risk-aversion over gains
is the same as that of risk-seeking over losses. This allows us to make a lot of analytical progress when
studying the entry problem. We will also lose the close-form expressions in Lemma 1 if fixed transaction
cost on sale is introduced: In this case the agent will only sell the asset when the utility proceed from the
sale U(γp−H −Γ) is larger than that of inaction U(−H) where Γ ≥ 0 represents a fixed market exit fee.
Then the payoff function of the exit problem will become G1(p;H) := max{U(γp−H − Γ), U(−H)}.
We now proceed to describe the optimal entry strategy of the agent.
Proposition 1. Suppose α ≤ β < 1. For the entry problem (4):
(1) If λγ ≤
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, there exists p∗1 ∈ [0,∞) such that the agent will enter the trade when
the asset price is at or above p∗1.
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(2) If λγ >
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, there exists a constant C ∈ (0,∞) independent of Ψ and R such
that:
(a) If ΨR < C, there exists 0 ≤ p∗1 < p∗2 < ∞ such that the agent will enter the trade when the
asset price is within the interval [p∗1, p
∗
2].
(b) If ΨR ≥ C, the agent will never enter the trade.
In all cases, the value function is given by V2(p) = g¯2(p
β) where g¯2 = g¯2(θ) is the smallest concave
majorant to
g2(θ) := max {v1(θ),−kRα} := max
{
(R+ Ψ)αf
((
γ
R+ Ψ
)β
θ
)
,−kRα
}
(8)
with
f(x) :=
α
β c
1−β(c− 1)α−1x− k(λγx1/β + 1)β
(λγx
1/β + 1)β−α
. (9)
Proposition 2. Suppose α < β = 1. For the entry problem (4):
(1) If λγ ≤ αk (c−1)α−1, there exists p∗1 ∈ [0,∞) such that the agent will enter the trade when the asset
price is at or above p∗1.
(2) If αk (c− 1)α−1 < λγ < (c−1)
α−1
k , there exists a constant C ∈ (0,∞) independent of Ψ and R such
that:
(a) If ΨR < C, there exists 0 ≤ p∗1 < p∗2 < ∞ such that the agent will enter the trade when the
asset price is within the interval [p∗1, p
∗
2].
(b) If ΨR ≥ C, the agent will never enter the trade.
(3) If λγ ≥ (c−1)
α−1
k , the agent will never enter the trade.
The value function has the same form in Proposition 1 on setting β = 1.
The value function of the entry problem is characterized by the smallest concave majorant to the payoff
function defined in (8). Indeed, the function v1 defined in (8) is simply the scaled value function of the
exit problem such that v1(θ) = V1(θ
1/β ;λθ1/β + Ψ + R). At a mathematical level, the various cases
arising in Proposition 1 and 2 are due to the different possible shapes of v1 under different combinations
of parameters. Some illustrations are given in Figure 1.
Economically, the optimal entry strategy crucially depends on the level of transaction costs relative to
the market and preference parameters. A fixed market entry fee in general discourage trading when the
asset price is low. Paying a flat fee of $10 to purchase an asset at $20 is much less appealing compared to
the case that the asset is trading at $1000, because in the former case the asset has to increase in value
by 50% just for breakeven against the fixed transaction fee paid. Meanwhile, proportional transaction
costs are the most significant for asset trading at high nominal price. A 10% transaction fee charged on a
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million worth of property is much more expensive in monetary terms relative to the same percentage fee
charged on a penny stock.
In case (1) of both Proposition 1 and 2, the proportional transaction costs are relatively low. Hence the
agent does not mind purchasing the asset at a high nominal price. He will just avoid purchasing the asset
when its price is very low due to the consideration of fixed transaction costs and therefore the purchase
region is in form of [p∗1,∞).
In case (2)(a), proportional transaction costs start becoming significant. On the one hand, the agent
avoids initiating the trade when the asset price is too low since the fixed entry cost will be too large relative
to the size of the trade. On the other hand, the agent does not want to trade an expensive asset when
the proportional costs are large. Upon balancing these two factors, the agent will wait when asset price is
either too low or too high, and will only purchase the asset when the price first enters an interval [p∗1, p
∗
2].
A very interesting feature of the optimal entry strategy is that the waiting region here is disconnected.
In case (2)(b) of Proposition 1, or case (2)(b) and (3) of Proposition 2, the overall level of transaction
costs is too high and hence the agent is discouraged from entering the trade in the first place. The key
difference between Proposition 1 and 2 is that when the asset has a strictly positive drift (β < 1 ⇐⇒
µ > 0), one must impose a strictly positive fixed entry cost in order to stop the agent from trading at all
price levels (if Ψ = 0, then either case (1) or (2)(a) applies in which case the agent is willing to enter the
trade at a certain price level). When the asset is a statistically fair gamble (β = 1 ⇐⇒ µ = 0), then a
high proportional transaction cost alone is sufficient to discourage the agent from trading. It is interesting
to note that the trading decision also depends on the agent’s reference point R. Comparing case (2)(a)
and case (2)(b) in Proposition 1 and 2, a low value of R will more often lead to the “no trading” case.
The economic interpretation is that an agent with low aspiration level (i.e. a low target benchmark) is
less likely to participate trading, especially when the (proportional) costs of trading are high.
When viewed in conjunction with the optimal exit strategy (as per Lemma 1), our model can encapsu-
late many styles of trading behaviors. If β ≤ 0 or β < α < 1 such that the exit problem is ill-posed, then
any purchase strategy can lead to infinite expected utility in the entry problem (4). For example, one can
purchase the asset at time zero (i.e. the choice of entry time is τ = 0) and then consider a sequence of sale
time νn := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt ≥ n}. When n→∞, the expected utility approaches infinity. This corresponds
to a “buy and hold” strategy.
In case (1) or (2)(a) of Proposition 1 and 2, if the asset price starts below p∗1 at time zero, then the
agent will purchase the asset when its price level increases to p∗1.
6 The agent will then seek to sell this
asset later when its price level further increases to
c(λp∗1+Ψ+R)
γ . This trading rule is thus a momentum
strategy in form of “buy high and sell higher”.
6Similar to Remark 1, the price process P may not reach a fixed level p∗1 > P0 in finite time. In this case the entry
strategy will not be executed and the payoff to the agent is zero.
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(a) Case (1) with: λ = 1.01, γ = 0.99, Ψ = 1. (b) Case (2)(a) with: λ = 1.1, γ = 0.9, Ψ = 1.
(c) Case (2)(b) with: λ = 1.1, γ = 0.9, Ψ = 2.5.
Figure 1. The scaled value functions of the entry problem under different cases of
Proposition 1. Base parameters used are: α = 0.5, k = 2.25, R = 1, β = 0.85.
If the asset price starts above p∗2 at time zero in case (2)(a), then the agent will buy the asset when its
price level drops to p∗2 and later to sell the asset when it increases to
c(λp∗2+Ψ+R)
γ . This is a counter-trend
trading strategy in form of “buy low sell high”.
Finally, in the high transaction cost cases (case (2)(b) of Proposition 1, and case (2)(b) or (3) of
Proposition 2) the agent will never participate in trading at any asset price level.
The various cases above are generated by different level of transaction costs relative to the other model
parameters. The following two corollaries highlight the role of transaction costs in relationship to the
optimal trading strategies.
Corollary 1. If λ = γ = 1, the agent will purchase the asset when its price level is at or above p∗1 for
some p∗1 ∈ [0,∞).
Corollary 2. Under the parameter combinations that p∗1 is well defined, if Ψ = 0 then we have p
∗
1 = 0.
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From Corollary 1, if there is no proportional transaction cost then the agent does not care about
entering the trade at a high nominal price level because he no longer needs to worry about the large
magnitude of trading fee arising from the proportional nature of the transaction costs. Hence “buy low
sell high” will not be observed as an optimal strategy. Similarly, Corollary 2 suggests that in absence
of fixed market entry fee the agent is happy to purchase an asset of any arbitrarily low price (in the
non-degenerate case) since now he does not need to take the size of the trade into account against any
fixed cost for breakeven consideration. Thus “buy high sell higher” will not be an optimal strategy in this
special case.
The critical trading boundaries in Proposition 1 and 2, although not being available in close-form in
general, can be characterized easily and in turn we can deduce some useful comparative statics.
Proposition 3 (Characterization of trading regions). In case (1) or case (2)(a) of Proposition 1 and 2,
p∗1 =
R+Ψ
γ (x
∗
1)
1/β where x∗1 is the (smaller) solution to
(
1 +
Ψ
R
)α k (λγx 1β + 1)β [λγ (1− αβ)x 1β + 1]− αβ c1−β(c− 1)α−1 λγ (1− αβ)x 1β+1(
λ
γx
1
β + 1
)β−α+1 = k. (10)
In case (2)(a) of Proposition 1 and 2, p∗2 =
R+Ψ
γ (x
∗
2)
1/β where x∗2 is the unique solution to
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
(
x−
1
β +
λα
γβ
)
− kλ
γ
(
x−
1
β +
λ
γ
)β
= 0. (11)
In the special case of α < β = 1, we have
p∗2 =
(R+ Ψ)[(c− 1)α−1 − kλ/γ]
λ[kλ/γ − α(c− 1)α−1] .
Proposition 4 (Comparative statics of purchase region). Under the parameters combination such that
p∗1 and/or p
∗
2 are well defined. We have:
(1) p∗1 is decreasing in γ and increasing in Ψ.
(2) p∗2 is decreasing in λ, increasing in γ and increasing in Ψ.
Figure 2b shows the critical purchase boundary p∗1 and p
∗
2 as γ varies. For very large value of γ such
that the condition in case (1) of Proposition 1 holds, the optimal strategy is to buy the asset when its
price exceeds p∗1 and that the agent is willing to enter the trade no matter how high the price is. Once
γ is smaller than a certain critical value (labeled by the vertical dotted line on the figure), parameters
condition in case (2)(a) of Proposition 1 applies. The optimal strategy now becomes to purchase the
asset only when its price is within a bounded range [p∗1, p
∗
2]. As γ further decreases, p
∗
1 increases while
p∗2 decreases so that the purchase region [p
∗
1, p
∗
2] shrinks. Once γ reaches another critical value, p
∗
1 and
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p∗2 converge and the purchase region diminishes entirely. This corresponds to case (2)(b) of Proposition 1
that the agent will not enter the trade at any price level.7
We do not mention in Proposition 4 the effect of λ on p∗1. While the example in Figure 2a shows that p
∗
1
is increasing in λ, numerical results show that p∗1 is not monotonic in λ in general. See Figure 3. Hence,
when viewed in conjunction with p∗2 the purchase region [p
∗
1, p
∗
2] does not necessarily shrink uniformly
when proportional cost on purchase increases, i.e. the agent may not delay the purchase decision. Similar
observations regarding potential non-monotonicity of trading decisions with respect to (proportional)
transaction costs are made by Hobson et al. (2019a) and Hobson et al. (2019b) in the context of portfolio
optimization.
(a) Comparative statics with respect to λ. The
dotted vertical line marked the critical value of λ
above which p∗2 exists.
(b) Comparative statics with respect to γ. The
dotted vertical line marked the critical value of γ
below which p∗2 exists.
(c) Comparative statics with respect to Ψ.
Figure 2. Comparative statics of the optimal purchase boundaries p∗1 and p
∗
2. Base
parameters used are: α = 0.5, k = 2.25, R = 1, β = 0.85, λ = 1.05, γ = 0.95, Ψ = 5.
7Note that the constant C in case (2) of Proposition 1 and 2 depends on λ and γ. Increasing λ
γ
will result in a switch
from case (2)(a) to case (2)(b).
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Figure 3. An illustration that p∗1 the lower bound of the purchase region may not be
monotonic with respect to λ. Base parameters used are: α = 0.5, k = 2.25, β = 0.85,
λ = 1.05, γ = 0.95, Ψ = 1.
Similarly, we can also examine the impact of the fixed market entry cost on the purchase decision. As
shown in Figure 2c, p∗1 and p
∗
2 are both increasing in Ψ. The agent in general is looking to buy the asset
at low price and then sell it at high price to make a profit. However, the fixed entry cost makes it less
appealing to trade an asset with low nominal price. As a result, the purchase region [p∗1, p
∗
2] shifts upwards
as Ψ increases and thus the agent will only enter the trade when the price level is reasonably high relative
to the fixed cost. Once Ψ reaches a critical high value, p∗1 and p
∗
2 coincide and the trading region vanishes.
This reflects the high fixed transaction cost scenario in case (2)(b) of Proposition 1.
Suppose there is a policy maker who wants to discourage the agent from purchasing the asset (for
example, as a mean to cool down a highly speculative real estate market). A natural measure to curb
trading participation is to increase transaction costs. However, Figure 2 reveals that there is a subtle
difference between the impact of proportional and fixed transaction cost on the agent’s trading behavior.
From Figure 2b, the effect of increasing proportional transaction cost on sale (i.e. decreasing γ) is
“monotonic” in terms of changing the trading decision of the agent. At any given current asset price
level, decreasing γ can only take the agent from the purchase region to the no trade region. Increasing
proportional transaction cost on sale can therefore unambiguously suppress the trading activities in the
market.
In contrast, the impact of the fixed market entry cost is somewhat unclear. Take Figure 2c as an
example and suppose the current price of the asset is $100. If there is no fixed market entry fee initially
(i.e. Ψ = 1), the agent will not participate in trading as he is in the no trade region. However, a policy
of increasing Ψ from zero to $4 will now put the agent in the purchase region such that he is willing
to purchase the asset immediately. It is exactly opposite to the intended outcome of the policy because
SPECULATIVE TRADING, PROSPECT THEORY AND TRANSACTION COSTS 16
the increase in Ψ actually encourages trading participation. The rationale behind this phenomenon is as
follows: Without any fixed transaction cost, the agent in general wants to wait when the asset price is
high as to get a lower entry level (and to mitigate the proportional transaction costs when the asset is
expensive). When the fixed entry cost increases, purchasing the asset at a low price is no longer favorable
and hence the agent may not want to delay the purchase decision anymore. Of course, as the fixed
cost further increases, say from Ψ = 4 to Ψ = 8, the agent will eventually enter the no trade region
again. Nonetheless, when the economy is consisting of multiple agents with heterogeneous preference
parameters, it is unclear from the outset whether increasing the fixed transaction costs can uniformly
discourage trading participation for all agents. Similarly, the non-monotonicity of p∗1 with respect to λ
the proportional transaction cost on purchase also implies that an increase in λ can potentially bring
certain agents from the no trade region to the purchase region. Our results suggest that proportional
transaction cost on sale can serve as a superior tool to control speculative trading in a market as its effect
is unambiguous.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper considers a dynamic trading model under Prospect Theory preference with transaction
costs. By solving a sequential optimal stopping problem, we find that the optimal trading strategy can
have various forms depending on the model parameters and the price level of the asset. The impact of
transaction costs is subtle. In contrast to conventional wisdom, increasing the fixed market entry cost
does not necessarily deter economic agents from trading participation. These results could potentially
be useful to policy makers to better understand how undesirable speculative trading behaviors in certain
markets can be effectively curbed.
Our key mathematical results are derived under a somewhat stylized modeling specification. In particu-
lar, asymmetry of degree of risk-aversion/seeking over gains/losses, fixed transaction cost on sale, negative
aspiration level and depreciating asset are currently omitted from the analysis. While these simplifica-
tions allow us to derive very sharp characterization and comparative statics of the optimal trading rules,
it will nonetheless be constructive to extend the model to further examine the impact of other economic
factors. For example, feature of stop-loss is currently absent among all the non-trivial strategies derived
in our model. Inspired by Henderson (2012), voluntary stop-loss can be observed in this style of optimal
stopping model when the excess return of the asset is negative.
A more ambitious goal is to further incorporate probability weighting within our continuous-time opti-
mal stopping model (as per Xu and Zhou (2013) and Henderson et al. (2018)) to fully reflect the features
of Prospect Theory framework of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). However, technical subtleties are likely
to arise due to the time-inconsistency nature brought by probability weighting. Precise formulation of
the problem as well as development of the appropriate mathematical techniques should prove to be an
another interesting proposal for future research.
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Appendix: proof of main results
Proof of Lemma 1. This largely follows from Henderson (2012) and here we will provide a quick sketch of
the proof. If β < 0, the problem is clearly ill-posed since Pt = exp
[(
µ− σ22
)
t+ σBt
]
= exp
[
σ
(−σ2βt+Bt)]
such that the drift term in the exponent is non-negative. The price process P will hence reach any strictly
positive level in finite time almost surely. For example, a sequence of stopping rules νn := inf{t > 0 :
Pt ≥ n} will give E[G1(Pνn ;H)] = U(γn−H)→∞ as n→∞.
For β > 0, the scaled payoff function is given by
g1(θ) = g1(θ;H) = G1(s
−1(θ);H) = U(γθ
1
β −H) =
(γθ
1
β −H)α, θ ≥
(
H
γ
)β
;
−k(H − γθ 1β )α, 0 ≤ θ <
(
H
γ
)β
.
It is straightforward to work out the derivatives of g1 as
g′1(θ) =

αγ
β θ
1
β−1(γθ
1
β −H)α−1, θ ≥
(
H
γ
)β
;
kαγ
β θ
1
β−1(H − γθ 1β )α−1, 0 ≤ θ <
(
H
γ
)β
,
and
g′′1 (θ) =

αγ
β θ
1
β−2(γθ
1
β −H)α−2
[
γ(α−β)
β θ
1
β − 1−ββ H
]
, θ ≥
(
H
γ
)β
;
kαγ
β θ
1
β−2(H − γθ 1β )α−2
[
γ(β−α)
β θ
1
β + 1−ββ H
]
, 0 ≤ θ <
(
H
γ
)β
.
When 0 < β < α < 1, over θ >
(
H
γ
)β
we have g1 being first increasing concave and then increasing
convex with limθ→∞ g′1(θ) = ∞. The smallest concave majorant of g1 is not well defined in this case.
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Then again sequence of stopping times νn with νn ↑ ∞ can be constructed which yields infinite expected
utility.
If α < β ≤ 1 or α = β < 1, then g1 is increasing concave on θ >
(
H
γ
)β
and is increasing convex on
0 ≤ θ <
(
H
γ
)β
. The smallest concave majorant can be formed by drawing a straight line from (0, g1(0))
which touches g1 at some θ
∗ >
(
H
γ
)β
. In particular, θ∗ is a solution to g1(θ)−g1(0)θ = g
′
1(θ) on θ >
(
H
γ
)β
,
i.e.
αγ
β
θ
1
β−1(γθ
1
β −H)α−1 = (γθ
1
β −H)α + kHα
θ
.
Conjecturing the solution in form of θ∗ = cβ
(
H
γ
)β
for some constant c > 1. Then direct substitution
shows that the constant c should solve (6). The smallest concave majorant of g1 is then
g¯1(θ) =
g1(θ), θ > θ
∗
g1(0) + θg
′
1(θ
∗), 0 ≤ θ < θ∗
=
(γθ
1
β −H)α, θ > cβ
(
H
γ
)β
−kHα + αβHα−βc1−β(c− 1)α−1γβθ, 0 ≤ θ < cβ
(
H
γ
)β
The value function is given by V1(p;H) = g¯1(s(p)) = g¯1(p
β) leading to (7). The corresponding optimal
stopping time is τ = inf {t ≥ 0 : Θt = θ∗} = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Pt = c
(
H
γ
)}
. 
We start with two useful lemmas before proving Proposition 1 and 2.
Lemma 2. Write ξ := λγ . For the function f defined in (9) we have
lim
x→+∞ f(x) =

+∞, ξ <
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
;
0, ξ =
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
;
−∞, ξ >
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
.
(12)
Moreover:
(1) Suppose α < β < 1:
(a) If ξ ≤
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, then f is an increasing concave function.
(b) If ξ >
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, then f is concave increasing on [0, x∗2], concave decreasing on
[x∗2, x˜] and convex decreasing on [x˜,∞). Here x∗2 and x˜ are respectively the solutions to the
equation
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
(
x−
1
β +
ξα
β
)
− kξ
(
x−
1
β + ξ
)β
= 0 (13)
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and
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
[
−ξα
β2
(β − α) + 1
β
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)
x−
1
β
]
− k
(
ξ + x−
1
β
)β [
−ξ
(
1− α
β
)
+
(
1
β
− 1
)
x−
1
β
]
= 0.
(14)
(2) Suppose α < β = 1:
(a) If ξ ≤ αk (c− 1)α−1, then f is an increasing concave function.
(b) If αk (c− 1)α−1 < ξ ≤ 1k (c− 1)α−1, then f is concave increasing on [0, x∗2], concave decreasing
on [x∗2, x˜] and convex decreasing on [x˜,∞) with
x∗2 :=
(c− 1)α−1 − kξ
ξ [kξ − α(c− 1)α−1] , x˜ :=
2(c− 1)α−1 − kξ
ξ [kξ − α(c− 1)α−1] .
(c) If ξ > 1k (c− 1)α−1, then f is a decreasing function.
Proof. We can rewrite f as
f(x) =
α
β c
1−β(c− 1)α−1 − k(ξ + x− 1β )β
(ξ + x−
1
β )β−α
x
α
β
such that lim
x→∞ f(x) = ±∞ when ξ ≷
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
. The corner case of ξ =
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
can be analyzed by a simple application of L’Hospital’s rule.
We now derive the shapes of f by first focusing on the case of β 6= 1. Direct differentiation gives
f ′(x) =
α
β
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
(
ξα
β x
1
β + 1
)
− kξx 1β−1
(
ξx
1
β + 1
)β
(
ξx
1
β + 1
)β−α+1 = αx 1β h1(x− 1β )
β
(
ξx
1
β + 1
)β−α+1 (15)
with
h1(z) := c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
(
z +
ξα
β
)
− kξ (z + ξ)β ,
and
f ′′(x) =
ξαx
1
β−2
β
(
ξx
1
β + 1
)β−α+2
{
c1−β(c− 1)α−1x
[
−ξα
β2
(β − α)x 1β + 1
β
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)]
− k
(
ξx
1
β + 1
)β [
−ξ
(
1− α
β
)
x
1
β +
1
β
− 1
]}
=
ξαx
2
β−1h2(x−
1
β )
β
(
ξx
1
β + 1
)β−α+2
where
h2(z) := c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
[
−ξα
β2
(β − α) + 1
β
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)
z
]
− k (ξ + z)β
[
−ξ
(
1− α
β
)
+
(
1
β
− 1
)
z
]
.
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We first investigate the convexity/concavity of f by studying the sign of f ′′(x), which is determined
by that of h2(x
− 1β ). Check that
h2(0) = ξ
(
1− α
β
)[
−α
β
c1−β(c− 1)α−1 + kξβ
]
,
h′2(0) = c
1−β(c− 1)α−1 1
β
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)
− kξβ
(
1
β
− β + α− 1
)
and
h′′2(z) = −k (ξ + z)β−2 [(1− β)(1 + β)z + ξ(1− β)(2 + β − α)] < 0
for all z > 0 since α ≤ β ≤ 1 and thus h2 is concave. Then there are two possibilities.
Suppose ξ ≤
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, then h2(0) ≤ 0 and
h′2(0) = c
1−β(c− 1)α−1 1
β
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)
− kξβ
(
1
β
− β + α− 1
)
< c1−β(c− 1)α−1 1
β
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)
− kξβ
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)
= k
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)[
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
βk
− ξβ
]
≤ k
(
α
β
− β + α− 1
)[
αc1−β(c− 1)α−1
βk
− ξβ
]
≤ 0
where we have used the facts that α < 1 and αβ − β + α − 1 < α − β ≤ 0. Since h2 is concave, we must
have h2(z) ≤ 0 for all z > 0. Hence f ′′2 (x) ≤ 0 for all x ≥ 0, i.e. f is a concave function.
Suppose instead ξ >
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, then h2(0) > 0 and
lim
z→∞
h2(z)
zβ+1
= −k
(
1
β
− 1
)
< 0
such that h2(z) → −∞ as z → ∞. As h2 is concave, we must have h2(z) down-crossing zero exactly
once on (0,∞). Hence f ′′2 (x) ∝ h2(x−
1
β ) has exactly one sign change from negative to positive, i.e. f is
concave for small x and convex for large x with a unique inflexion point x˜ which is given by the solution
to h2(x
− 1β ) = 0. This corresponds to equation (14).
Now we look at the monotonicity of f via the sign of f ′(x) which in turn is determined by that of
h1(x
− 1β ). Check that
h1(0) = ξ
[
α
β
c1−β(c− 1)α−1 − kξβ
]
,
h′1(z) = c
1−β(c− 1)α−1 − kξβ
(z + ξ)
1−β .
Observe that h′1 is increasing and thus h1 is convex. There are two cases.
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Suppose ξ ≤
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, then h1(0) ≥ 0 and
h′1(0) = c
1−β(c− 1)α−1 − kβξβ ≥ αc1−β(c− 1)α−1 − kβξβ ≥ 0.
As h1 is convex, we must have h1(z) ≥ 0 for all z > 0. Hence f ′(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0, i.e. f is an
increasing function. Together with the consideration of f ′′ in this parameter regime, f is an increasing
concave function.
Suppose ξ >
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, then we have h1(0) < 0 instead. We also have
lim
z→∞
h1(z)
z
= c1−β(c− 1)α−1 > 0 (16)
and hence h1(z) → ∞ as z → ∞. Since h1 is convex, h1 must up-cross zero exactly once on (0,∞).
Therefore f ′(x) ∝ h1(x− 1β ) changes sign exactly once, from which we conclude f is first increasing and
then decreasing with a unique turning point x∗2. Moreover, x
∗
2 is the solution to h1(x
− 1β ) = 0 which is
equivalent to (13). Taking the behavior of f ′′ into consideration, we conclude that f is increasing concave
[0, x∗2], decreasing concave on [x
∗
2, x˜] and decreasing convex on [x˜,∞).
The case of β = 1 can be handled similarly. The key difference is that (16) no longer holds when β = 1
but rather we will have
lim
z→∞
h1(z)
z
= (c− 1)α−1 − kξ
instead which can be either positive or negative. In the case of ξ > (c−1)
α−1
k , we have h1(z) → −∞ as
z →∞. We can then deduce f ′(x) is negative for all x and thus f is decreasing. 
Lemma 3. If ξ := λγ >
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, then f(x) < 0 for all x where f is defined in (9).
Proof. The result follows directly from the definition of f that
f(x) =
[
α
β
c1−β(c− 1)α−1x
(
λ
γ
x1/β + 1
)−β
− k
](
λ
γ
x1/β + 1
)α
<
[
k
(
λ
γ
)β
x
(
λ
γ
x1/β + 1
)−β
− k
](
λ
γ
x1/β + 1
)α
<
[
k
(
λ
γ
)β
x
(
λ
γ
x1/β + 0
)−β
− k
](
λ
γ
x1/β + 1
)α
= 0.

Proof of Proposition 1. From the discussion in Section 3, we have to identify the smallest concave majo-
rant of the function
g2(θ) := max{V1(s−1(θ);λs−1(θ) + Ψ +R), U(−R)} = max{V1(θ 1β ;λθ 1β + Ψ +R), U(−R)}
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where V1 is the value function of the exit problem given in Lemma 1. Since we assume R > 0 and that
c > 1, Ψ ≥ 0 and γ ≤ 1 ≤ λ, we have c
(
λθ
1
β +Ψ+R
γ
)
≥ θ 1β and hence first the definition of (7) will always
apply when evaluating V1(θ
1
β ;λθ
1
β + Ψ +R), i.e.
v1(θ) := V1(θ
1
β ;λθ
1
β + Ψ +R)
= −k(λθ 1β + Ψ +R)α + α
β
(λθ
1
β + Ψ +R)α−βc1−β(c− 1)α−1γβθ
= Rα
(
1 +
Ψ
R
)α α
β
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
(
λ
γ
γθ
1
β
R+ Ψ
+ 1
)α−β (
γ
R+ Ψ
)β
θ − k
(
λ
γ
γθ
1
β
R+ Ψ
+ 1
)α
= Rα
(
1 +
Ψ
R
)α
f
((
γ
R+ Ψ
)β
θ
)
(17)
where f is defined in (9). The shape of f under different parameters combination is given by Lemma 2
and thus we have the following cases.
When ξ := λγ ≤
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, f is increasing concave with lim
x→∞ f(x) = +∞. These prop-
erties are inherited by v1. Furthermore, v1(0) = R
α(1 + Ψ/R)αf(0) = −kRα(1 + Ψ/R)α ≤ −kRα and
lim
θ→∞
v1(θ) > 0 > −kRα. Thus g2 is constructed by truncating an increasing concave function from below
at −kRα. The smallest concave majorant of g2 is formed by drawing a tangent line passing through
(0,−kRα) which touches v1 at some θ∗1 . See Figure 1a. The optimal strategy is to sell the asset when its
transformed price Θt first reaches θ
∗
1 or above. The corresponding threshold in the original price scale is
given by p∗1 := s
−1(θ∗1) = (θ
∗
1)
1/β .
When ξ = λγ >
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, Lemma 2 implies that v1 is first concave increasing, reaching
a global maximum at some θ∗2 , concave decreasing and finally convex decreasing with lim
θ→∞
v1(θ) = −∞.
There are two further possibilities.
If v1(θ
∗
2) > −kRα, then there must exist 0 ≤ θˆ1 < θˆ2 such that g2(θ) = −kRα on [0, θˆ1] ∪ [θˆ2,∞) and
g2(θ) = v1(θ) on [θˆ1, θˆ2]. The smallest concave majorant of g2(θ) is formed by a chord passing (0,−kRα)
which touches v1 at some θ
∗
1 < θ
∗
2 , and a horizontal line at level g(θ
∗
2) on θ > θ
∗
2 . See Figure 1b. The
optimal strategy is to purchase the asset when its transformed price Θt first enters the interval [θ
∗
1 , θ
∗
2 ].
The boundary of the purchase regions in the naive scale can be recovered via p∗i = (θ
∗
i )
1/β for i = 1, 2.
If v1(θ
∗
2) ≤ −kRα instead, then v1(θ) ≤ −kRα for all θ. Thus g2(θ) = −kRα which is a flat horizontal
line, and it is also the smallest concave majorant of itself. The optimal strategy is not to trade at all at
any price level such that the utility received is always U(−R) = −kRα. See Figure 1c.
The “never purchase” case arises if and only if v1(θ
∗
2) ≤ −kRα or equivalently
Rα
(
1 +
Ψ
R
)α
f
((
γ
R+ Ψ
)β
θ∗2
)
≤ −kRα ⇐⇒
(
1 +
Ψ
R
)α
f(x∗2) ≤ −k
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where x∗2 is the maximizer of f introduced in Lemma 2 and it is independent of
Ψ
R . Using the fact that
f(0) = −k and Lemma 3, we have −k < f(x∗) < 0 and hence there must exist C :=
[
− kf(x∗)
]1/α
− 1 > 0
such that
(
1 + ΨR
)α
f(x∗) ≤ −k if and only if Ψ/R ≥ C. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Omitted since it is largely than same as the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The result will follow if we can show that
[
α
βk c
1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
> 1 such that case
(1) of Proposition 1 and 2 always applies when λ = γ = 1. The required inequality is[
α
βk
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
> 1 ⇐⇒ α
β
c1−β(c− 1)α−1 > k
⇐⇒ α
β
c1−β(c− 1)α−1 > α
β
c(c− 1)α−1 − (c− 1)α
⇐⇒ F (c) := (c− 1)α − α
β
c(c− 1)α−1(1− c−β) > 0
where we have used (6). Using simple calculus we can show that F (x) > 0 for all x > 1. This concludes
the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 2. This will follow immediately from Proposition 3 by observing that x = 0 is the
solution to (10) when Ψ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that θ∗1 is the point of contact of the tangent
line to v1 which passes (0,−kRα). Hence θ∗1 should solve
v′1(θ)−
v1(θ) + kR
α
θ
= 0. (18)
Furthermore, we can deduce from a graphical inspection that the solution to (18) is a down-crossing.8
Using the representation of v1(θ) in (17), (18) can be rewritten as
Rα
(
1 +
Ψ
R
)α(
γ
R+ Ψ
)β
f ′
((
γ
R+ Ψ
)β
θ
)
−
Rα
(
1 + ΨR
)α
f
((
γ
R+Ψ
)β
θ
)
+ kRα
θ
= 0.
A further substitution of x =
(
γ
R+Ψ
)β
θ leads to(
1 +
Ψ
R
)α
[xf ′(x)− f(x)] = k. (19)
Then p∗1 = (θ
∗
1)
1/β = R+Ψγ (x
∗
1)
1/β where x∗1 is defined as the solution to (19) which is equivalent to (10).
Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 as well that θ∗2 is the maximizer of v2(θ). Using the representation
of (17), θ∗2 should then solve f
′
((
γ
R+Ψ
)β
θ
)
= 0. Using (15), x∗2 :=
(
γ
R+Ψ
)β
θ∗2 is a solution to
h1(x
− 1β ) = c1−β(c− 1)α−1
(
x−
1
β +
ξα
β
)
− kξ
(
x−
1
β + ξ
)β
= 0.
8For the large proportional transaction costs case ξ = λ
γ
>
[
α
βk
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
] 1
β
, the straight line passing (0,−kRα)
can touch v1 at two distinct locations. A simple geometric inspection will tell us that the required root is the smaller one.
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Then the result follows since p∗2 = (θ
∗
2)
1/β = R+Ψγ (x
∗
2)
1/β . 
Proof of Proposition 4. From the proof of Proposition 3, the required solution to equation (10) is a down-
crossing. Then given that the left hand side of (10) is increasing in Ψ (when evaluated at x = x∗1) we can
deduce x∗1 and in turn p
∗
1 are both increasing in Ψ.
To show that p∗1 is decreasing in γ, consider a substitution of q =
x1/β
γ . Then p
∗
1 = (R+ Ψ)q
∗
1 where q
∗
1
is the solution to(
1 +
Ψ
R
)α k (λq + 1)β [λ(1− αβ) q + 1]− αβ c1−β(c− 1)α−1λγβ (1− αβ) qβ+1
(λq + 1)
β−α+1 = k (20)
where the left hand side of (20) is decreasing in γ. Hence q∗1 and in turn p
∗
1 are both decreasing in γ.
The monotonicity of p∗2 with respect to Ψ is trivial because equation (11) which defines x
∗
2 does not
depend on Ψ. To check the monotonicity with respect to γ, consider a substitution of q = x
1/β
γ again so
that p∗2 = (R+ Ψ)q
∗
2 where q
∗
2 is defined as the solution to
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
(
1
q
+
λα
β
)
− kλ
γβ
(
1
q
+ λ
)β
= 0. (21)
From the proof of Lemma 2, the solution to h1(x
− 1β ) = 0 is a down-crossing. This property is inherited
by (21). Moreover, the left hand side of (21) is increasing in γ. Hence q∗2 and in turn p
∗
2 is increasing in
γ.
Similarly, consider a substitution of y = λβx. Then p∗2 =
R+Ψ
λγ (y
∗
2)
1/β where y∗2 is defined as the solution
to
c1−β(c− 1)α−1
(
y−
1
β +
α
βγ
)
− kλ
β
γ
(
y−
1
β +
1
γ
)β
= 0. (22)
The left hand side of (22) is decreasing in λ and hence y∗2 is decreasing in λ. Therefore p
∗
2 is decreasing
in λ as well. 
